Journal of Philosophy and Theology

Defending A Dogma: Between Grice, Strawson and Quine
Elvis Imafidon

Abstract
One of Quine’s most important legacies is the theorization of two dogmas of empiricism and these dogmas have served as the most severe challenge to the empiricist/positivist tradition. In fact, if not replied to, the dogmas could threaten the very foundation of any meaningful discourse in the sciences. For this reason, Grice and Strawson in “In Defence of a Dogma” attempt a reply to the charge of dogmatism in the analytic-synthetic distinction, showing that the charge does not hold. This essay pays attention to the arguments raised by Grice and Strawson in justifying their stance showing that although it is not foolproof, it provides reasonable grounds for not entirely rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction.

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